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Congress often enacts statutes that create specific causes of action
for aggrieved individuals.1 Many federal statutes, however, create duties
with no corresponding action for breach,2 leaving courts to create causes
1. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (civil enforcement action for violations of
antitrust laws); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1988) (action for infringement); Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988) (action for misrepresentation regarding goods, services, or commercial
activities).
2. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) (granting
authority to the Securities Exchange Commission to regulate securities fraud but providing no
recourse for those injured by securities fraud).
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of action for individuals owed those duties.' When the courts, rather
than Congress, create a cause of action, no specific statute of limitations
governs the suit. Surprisingly, many statutory causes of action also lack
limitation periods." Courts frequently face actions not governed by any
statute of limitations because traditionally there has been no general
statute of limitations governing all federal actions.
Courts usually are not content to find that a party may bring suit
at any time after the cause of action accrues." Throughout history,
courts have found time limitations necessary to protect possible defend-
ants, the judicial system, and society in general.7 Because many feder-
ally derived causes of action do not have statutory limitation periods,
courts must look elsewhere for appropriate time restrictions.8
In 1990 Congress sought to relieve the courts of the arduous task of
borrowing limitation periods. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
(the Act) contains a general statute of limitations governing actions
arising under federal statutes that contain no specific limitation peri-
ods.10 Part II of this Note discusses the Act in more detail. Part III
evaluates options courts have when confronting a federal cause of ac-
tion with no limitation period, including borrowing from state law, bor-
rowing from federal law, applying no limitation period, limiting the
3. The general assumption is that such actions are within Congress's intent. See, e.g., J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
4. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1988) (specifying no
limitation period for civil actions for deprivation of civil rights); Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988) (specifying no limitation period for civil
actions for violations of collective bargaining agreements); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988) (specifying no limitation period for civil enforcement actions
for violation of § 1962 of the Act).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) places a general five-year limit on actions brought "for the en-
forcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture" except as otherwise provided by Congress.
Courts, however, have interpreted this statute narrowly to apply only to actions brought by or on
behalf of the United States. See Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785, 788-
89 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960). See also Comment, A Functional Approach to
Borrowing Limitations Periods for Federal Statutes, 77 CAL. L. REV. 133, 166-67 (1989) (suggesting
that courts expand their interpretation of § 2462).
,6. "A federal cause of action 'brought at any distance of time' would be 'utterly repugnant
tp 'the genius of our laws.' . . . Just determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of the
passage of time, the memories of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost. In compelling circum-
stances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten." Wilson v. Gar-
cia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805)).
7. For an in-depth discussion of the purposes of time limitations, see Special Project, Time
Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limi-
tations, 65 CORNEL L. REv. 1011, 1014-20 (1980).
8. See infra Part III.
9. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5114 (codified as amended in scattered titles of 28 U.S.C.).
10. The Act provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action
arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not
be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues." Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 313(a).
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action with laches, or simply creating an appropriate period. Part IV
examines steps Congress could take to ensure that every action arising
under a federal statute has an appropriate limitation period and exam-
ines constitutional concerns regarding congressional delegation of the
power to fix statutes of limitations. Finally, this Note concludes that
the general fallback statute of limitations in the Act is insufficient as a
remedy for the uncertainty caused by Congress's failure to provide limi-
tation periods in statutes that create causes of action. Because courts
are unable to provide uniform solutions to this problem, Congress must
enact additional legislation.
II. THE JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1990
On December 1, 1990 President George Bush signed into law the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.11 The Act covers many aspects of
the federal judiciary, including jurisdiction, removal, venue, the role of
magistrates, litigation management, and limitation periods for actions
arising under federal statutes.'2 The statute of limitations provision was
prompted by conclusions reached by the Federal Courts Study
Committee.
A. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee' s
On April 2, 1990 the Federal Courts Study Committee issued its
final report containing many recommendations for improving the fed-
11. See Legislation: Mixed Bag of Changes Designed to Improve Federal Practice, 59
U.S.L.W. 2419 (Jan. 15, 1991); The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 1990,
at 1.
12. Title I of the Act, the Civil Justice Reform Act, requires every federal district court to
implement a "civil justice expense and delay reduction plan," the purpose of which is to streamline
the process of adjudicating civil cases. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1991)). Title II, the Federal Judgeship Act, creates 85 new federal judge-
ships. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 202-203 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(1), 133 (Supp.
1991)). Title I, the Federal Courts Study Implementation Act, implements some of the recom-
mendations made by the Federal Courts Study Committee, including the statute of limitations
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which is discussed in this Note. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 301-325
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see infra subpart II(B). Title IV, the
Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform Act, designed to augment the Judicial Discipline Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1988)), creates the National
Commission on Judicial Impeachment to make recommendations to Congress for improving the
process for discipline and impeachment of federal judges. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 408-418 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
13. Congress created this Committee with the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4643 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.), to study the federal courts' growing caseload and to create a comprehensive plan for im-
provement. The Committee, which lasted 15 months, was comprised of 15 members appointed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Members included five federal judges, including Judge Joseph Weis, Jr.,
chairman of the Committee, Judge Jose Cabranes, Judge Levin Campbell, Judge Judith Keep, and
Judge Richard Posner; Washington Supreme Court Justice Keith Callow; Assistant U.S. Attorney
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eral judiciary. 14 The Committee recommended that every federal stat-
ute creating a cause of action should include a statute of limitations
and that Congress should adopt limitation periods for those statutory
actions which lacked them.15 The Committee's report also suggested
that Congress should enact a general fallback statute of limitations for
federal claims that were not created explicitly by Congress. 16 This
falback statute of limitations also would cover any express action for
which Congress neglected to create a specific limitation.
7
B. Congress's Response: Section 1658
In response to these recommendations, Congress enacted Section
313 of the Act, amending Title 28 of the United States Code with Sec-
tion 1658. That section imposed a four-year limitation on civil actions
arising under federal statutes which themselves contain no specific limi-
tation periods. 8 With Section 1658, Congress enacted a general fallback
statute of limitations. Section 1658, however, applies only to actions
arising under statutes enacted after December 1, 1990.11 Therefore, Sec-
tion 1658 does not apply to the many federal causes of action created
before that date.20
It is unclear why Congress limited the scope of Section 1658. The
current version of Section 1658, however, is incapable of effecting its
primary purpose. Section 1658 was designed to provide a standard limi-
tation period for all the federal causes of action, regardless of whether
Congress or the courts created those causes of action that had no fixed
limitation.2 Because the Section expressly provides that it only applies
General Edward Dennis; former Solicitor General Rex Lee; Diana Gribbon Motz and Morris
Harell, private practitioners; Vince Aprile, general counsel of the Department of Public Advocacy,
State of Kentucky; Senators Howell Heflin and Charles Grassley; and Representatives Carlos
Moorhead and Robert Kastenmeier. 136 CONG. REc. E2501 (daily ed. July 26, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier).
14. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Study Com-
mittee Report].
15. Id. at 93.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. 1991). Other recommendations Congress enacted were those re-
garding supplemental jurisdiction, venue, removal, witness and juror fees, and bankruptcy appeals.
Congress did not enact proposals to limit diversity jurisdiction, shift most drug prosecutions from
federal to state courts, create an appellate tax court, and establish a new Article I court to review
social security disability claims. See The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, supra note 11;
Sweeping Changes in Federal Judiciary Urged by Federal Courts Study Committee, 58 U.S.L.W.
2599, 2601 (Apr. 17, 1990).
19. The section limits its application to actions arising after its enactment on December 1,
1990. See supra note 10.
20. For examples, see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
21. "[Section 1658] provides a fall-back statute of limitations .. for federal civil actions by
1358 [Vol. 44:1355
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to causes of action arising under statutes enacted after its passage, 22 it
cannot reach those older causes of action. Yet these were the same
causes of action that served as the impetus for Section 1658's
enactment.2"
Congress probably intended for the fallback statute of limitations
to govern all causes of action accruing after December 1, 1990, regard-
less of when the particular cause of action was created. This interpreta-
tion is strengthened by other language in the Act.24 The language of
Section 1658 itself, however, can mean only that the fallback period is
to apply to statutory causes of action created after the Act.2" Thus, if
Congress wants the fallback period to apply to all statutory causes of
action lacking limitation periods, it must amend Section 1658. It is un-
fortunate that all of the efforts of Congress and the Federal Courts
Study Committee have failed to solve the limitations problem.
III. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE COURTS
Since Congress did not address actions arising under older statutes,
courts hearing such claims will have to decide what time limitations, if
any, to place on them.28 This Part discusses the methods the Supreme
Court has used to select limitation periods and other proposals courts
and commentators have suggested.
A. Borrow a State Limitation Period
A court facing a federal action lacking a limitation period most
often borrows from the forum state's statute of limitations governing
analogous state law claims.27 The court first characterizes the federal
action and then examines the state's statute of limitations controlling
similar claims. 8 If more than one limitation period is available, the
court chooses the period that seems most appropriate by weighing the
providing that, except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress
may not be commenced later than four years after the cause of action accrues." 136 CONG. REc.
S17,581 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
22. See supra note 10.
23. One can assume that the Federal Courts Study Committee and Congress were concerned
more with present difficulties with existing causes of action than with the possibility of future
difficulties with future causes of action. Indeed, the Committee's report recommended that Con-
gress adopt limitation periods for existing causes of action that lacked them. Study Committee
Report, supra note 14, at 93.
24. Section 313(c) of the Act provides that § 1658 "shall apply with respect to causes of
action accruing on or after the date of the enactment of this Act." Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 313(c).
25. See supra note 10.
26. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
27. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1980).
28. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269-75 (1985).
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factors considered by the state legislature in selecting its limitation pe-
riods.29 State legislatures may have considered factors such as the plain-
tiff's interest in bringing suit, the defendant's interest in repose, the
judiciary's interest in evidence that has not become stale, and the prac-
tical problems associated with litigation of a particular claim.30 Gener-
ally, a court assumes that the limitation period for analogous state
claims addresses all of these concerns.3
The Supreme Court applied a state statute of limitations to a claim
arising under federal law for the first time in 1830, in M'Cluny v. Sil-
liman.3' The plaintiff claimed that a federal land office registrar had
breached a duty created by a federal statute.3 3 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's decision that Ohio's statute of limitations
barred the claim. 4 The plaintiff argued that the state's statute of limi-
tations could not bar a claim asserting a right created by federal law
because the state legislature could not have considered such an action
when it enacted the statute.3 5 The plaintiff also contended that af-
firming the lower court would result in different limitations in different
states for the same federal action. 6 The Supreme Court was not per-
suaded, however, and held that the Rules of Decision Act 37 required
that state statutes of limitations govern federal statutory actions when
Congress had created no specific limitation.38
Although most commentators 9 and most of the present Supreme
29. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
30. See Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1127, 1134-41
(1979).
31. "In borrowing a state period of limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a
federal court is relying on the State's wisdom in setting a limit ... on the prosecution of a closely
analogous claim." Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 464.
32. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
33. Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 29, 58, 1 Stat. 468. The Act provided for the sale of lands
belonging to the United States northwest of the Ohio River and above the mouth of the Kentucky
River. M'Cluny sued under § 10, which required land registers to enter all purchase applications.
M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 270-71.
34. The circuit court held that Ohio's six-year statute of limitations for actions on the case
barred the claim. M'Cluny, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 276. The failure to enter his purchase application
occurred on August 2, 1810, but the plaintiff did not bring suit until December 15, 1823. Id. at 270.
35. Id. at 273-74.
36. Id. at 274.
37. The Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). The Act was substantially the same at the time of the
M'Cluny decision, with the words "in trials at common law" in place of "in civil actions." Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92. For a discussion of the legislative history behind the original
act, see Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REV.
49 (1923).
38. M'Cluny, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 276-79.
39. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 152-55; Note, supra note 30, at 1135-37. For a pro-
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Court Justices 0 question the correctness of the reasoning of M'Cluny,
the case established a preference for state borrowing that continues
today.4
Fifty-five years after M'Cluny, the Court modified its stance on the
Rules of Decision Act in Campbell v. Haverhill.42 The Court noted that
the Rules of Decision Act generally required application of the state's
statute of limitations when Congress provided none, but explained that
the state's statute would not apply if it appeared unduly burdensome or
discriminatory to the federal action.43 The Court then found that in the
case before it the state's statute did not burden the federal action and
applied the state limitation period." Campbell is significant, however,
because it gave courts discretion in applying state limitation periods
when federal rights might be prejudiced.45
Not until 1946, in Holmberg v. Armbrecht,46 did the Court decide
that the Rules of Decision Act did not mandate application of state
limitation periods. 47 The Court began by noting that congressional si-
lence traditionally had been interpreted to mean that Congress in-
tended federal courts to adopt the local statutes of limitations in
actions at law.48 Despite this interpretation, the Court held that it
would not necessarily borrow limitation periods for actions in equity.49
Thus, Holmberg gave courts even greater discretion in cases in which a
federal action had no explicit limitation period.50
bative analysis of M'Cluny's application of the Rules of Decision Act, see Special Project, supra
note 7, at 1025-30.
40. See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983)
(finding that the Rules of Decision Act requires application of a state's limitation period only when
federal law does not provide one and that the choice of a limitation period for a federal cause of
action was itself a question of federal law, rendering the Act inapplicable). But see Justice Ste-
vens's dissenting opinion in DelCostello, stating that the Act required application of state statutes
of limitations. Id. at 172-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158-59.
42. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
43. Id. at 614-15.
44. Id. at 615-21. The Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that his action for patent
infringement was outside the Rules of Decision Act because the federal courts had exclusive juris-
diction. Id. at 614-15. The Court apparently assumed the only alternative was that no limitation
applied. Id. at 616-17.
45. For a thorough discussion of the Campbell Court's reasoning, see Special Project, supra
note 7, at 1031-37.
46. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
47. Id. at 395.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 396-97.
50. The Holmberg Court announced a new rationale for state borrowing: "The implied ab-
sorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of federal enactments is a phase of
fashioning remedial details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial determina-
tion within the general framework of familiar legal principles." Id. at 395.
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Since the Holmberg decision, the Supreme Court generally has fol-
lowed the presumption in favor of borrowing state statutes of limita-
tions.5 1 As state law has created different statutes of limitations
governing more specific causes of action, the Court has focused its at-
tention on exactly which statutes of limitations are most analogous
under state law.52 The Court in these cases attempts to find the most
appropriate time restriction by focusing on the state law action most
analogous to the federal cause of action.53 The Justices, however, often
have disagreed over which state period is most appropriate. 4
Many commentators have questioned both the necessity and the
wisdom of borrowing state statutes of limitations.5 5 These commenta-
tors have proposed alternatives to state borrowing that would create
uniformity among the states and reduce the uncertainty as to which
statute of limitations will apply.
56
B. Borrow a Federal Limitation Period
Some commentators have suggested 57 that the Supreme Court first
borrowed a statute of limitations from an analogous federal cause of
51. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272-75, 280 (1985) (rejecting the prior practice
of determining the most analogous statute of limitations for civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 on a case-by-case basis, and ruling that henceforth all such claims would be governed by the
states' personal injury statutes of limitations); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239-50 (1989) (hold-
ing that each state's residual personal injury statute of limitations would apply rather than the
statute of limitations for enumerated intentional torts). For a discussion of the problems courts
face when searching state law for the most analogous statute of limitations, see New York State
Bar Association, Report on the Application of Statutes of Limitations in Federal Litigation, 53
ALB. L. REv. 3 (1988) [hereinafter New York Report] (focusing on federal securities regulation, civil
rights actions, and labor law).
53. It is thought that the same values that compelled the state legislature to select the limi-
tation period will serve the federal interests reflected in a similar federal statute. See supra note
31.
54. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981) (Justices disagreeing as to
whether to apply the state's statute of limitations governing actions to vacate arbitration awards or
the state's statute governing contract actions to a claim brought under § 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act).
55. See sources cited infra note 56.
56. Disuniformity results because borrowing state law can result in many different statutory
time bars governing the same federally created action. Uncertainty results because plaintiffs in
different states do not know what limitation governs their action until the courts determine which
state statute will apply. The list of the borrowing approach's detractors is long, but for a survey of
their complaints, see Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NoTRE DAME, L. Rav. 693 (1988); New York Report, supra note 52; Blume &
George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 937 (1951); Comment, supra note 5;
Comment, Determining Limitation Periods for Actions Arising Under Federal Statutes, 41 Sw.
L.J. 895 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Determining Limitation Periods]; Note, Disparities in
Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YALE L.J. 738 (1940).
57. See, e.g., Comment, Determing Limitation Periods supra note 56, at 914-15.
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action in 1958 in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,58 but that sug-
gestion is misleading. In McAllister the Court held only that when a
judicially created federal action for unseaworthiness5 9 was combined
with an action under the Jones Act,6 0 a court could not apply a state
statute of limitations that was shorter than the limitation that Congress
provided for the statutory action.6 1 Thus, the McAllister case did not
concern a statutory right for which Congress had provided no statute of
limitations.6 2 The majority opinion stated only that the practicalities of
litigation dictated that both actions be brought together."' Thus, the
application of a state limitation period shorter than the period pre-
scribed for the statutory right would have shortened the period for the
latter, denying the full benefit of the federal law. 4
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion suggested that the Jones Act
limitation should apply to the analogous action for unseaworthiness be-
cause it was the logical source from which to draw. 5 The dissenters
argued that the two actions were independent and that when federal
rights were silent on the matter of limitation, the state statute of limi-
tations applied.6 The dissenters believed that uniformity was desirable,
but that such a change in the law was for Congress, and not the Court,
to effect.
6 7
The first time the Supreme Court actually borrowed a statute of
limitations from an analogous federal statute was in 1983. DelCostello
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters s involved "hybrid" suits
brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 9
The Court previously had held that after a plaintiffs union has brought
58. 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
59. An unseaworthiness claim is a cause of action under general maritime law alleging that
the shipowner or operator breached a duty to furnish a vessel reasonably fit for its intended use.
See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). See generally T. SCHOENBAUM, ADMI-
RALTY AND MARTIMmE LAW §§ 4-5, 5-3 (1987).
60. The Jones Act provides that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may ... maintain an action for damages at law." 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1988).
61. McAllister, 357 U.S. at 224. While the state court had applied the state's two-year per-
sonal injury statute of limitations to the unseaworthiness action, McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 290 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Texas Civ. App. 1956), the Jones Act had a three-year statute of limita-
tions. McAllister, 357 U.S. at 225 n.6.
62. Instead, the Court had to determine what statute of limitations to apply to the unseawor-
thiness action, which was grounded in general maritime law. See supra note 59.
63. McAllister, 357 U.S. at 225-26.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 227-30 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 232 (Whittaker, J., joined by Frankfurter & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
67. Id. at 234.
68. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
69. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) authorizes suit in federal
court for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
1991] 1363
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a formal grievance against his employer unsuccessfully, the plaintiff
may bring a hybrid action against both the employer, for breach of con-
tract, and the union, for breach of its duty of fair representation.7
Since neither claim is governed by an express limitation period, the
Court was forced to select one.7 1 Again, the Court stated the presump-
tion that Congress intended for the courts to borrow from state law, 2
but intimated that the preference for state limitation periods was a
fallback rule rather than an attempt to ascertain legislative intent.73
Citing McAllister, the Court noted that it previously had borrowed
from federal rather than state law. 4 Although the Court acknowledged
that it had applied state statutes of limitations to actions under Section
301, it distinguished those cases because they involved only actions
against the employer.7 An action solely against the employer was anal-
ogous either to a state law contract action or an action to vacate an
arbitration award.7 6 Because the hybrid suits in DelCostello also con-
tained claims against unions, these analogies no longer controlled. 77 In-
stead, because the Court had created a cause of action against the
unions based on the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act,78 no
70. Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). To recover damages against either the union or the
employer, the plaintiff employee must prove both that the employer breached the collective bar-
gaining agreement and that the union breached its duty of fair representation. See DelCostello,
462 U.S. at 164-65.
71. While the claim against the employer is based on § 301, the claim against the union
actually is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 160
(1988). The claim under the NLRA does not have a statute of limitations because it was judicially
created. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164 n.14. The LMRA simply does not provide a statute of
limitations for actions brought under § 301. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 697-98
(1966).
72. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158.
73. Id. at 158 n.12.
74. Id. at 162. The Court apparently reinterpreted its holding in McAllister as applying the
Jones Act statute of limitations to all unseaworthiness actions. The McAllister opinion, however,
stressed that it found merely that the Jones Act preempted state limitation periods of less than
three years. 357 U.S. at 225 n.6. This new interpretation traced Justice Brennan's concurring opin-
ion in McAllister. See supra text accompanying note 65. This may be explained by the fact that
Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in DelCostello. See 462 U.S. at 154.
75. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162-65.
76. Id. In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), the Court held that a
straightforward suit under § 301 for breach of a collective bargaining agreement by an employer
was most akin to actions on unwritten contracts. Id. at 705-08. Thus, the state statute of limita-
tions governing those actions would apply. Id. at 707. In United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S.
56 (1981), the Court held that an action brought by an employee against his employer under § 301
following a grievance and arbitration procedure was most like an action to vacate an arbitration
award. Id. at 62. Thus, the Court held that the state statute governing those claims would be
applied. Id. at 64.
77. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165-69.
78. See supra note 71.
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state law analogy existed. 9
The Court then noted that state law was not the only source availa-
ble for borrowing.80 A federal statute of limitations, which was designed
to address a balance of interests very similar to those at stake in the
suit, existed under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act.81
The Court borrowed Section 10(b)'s six-month period for filing unfair
labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board.2 The
Court stressed that resort to state law remained the norm for borrow-
ing, indicating that it would turn away from state law only when a fed-
eral rule clearly provided a closer analogy and the federal rule was
significantly more appropriate in light of federal policy concerns and
the practicalities of litigation. 83
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, argued that the Rules of Decision
Act required courts to borrow state limitation periods.8 4 Therefore, the
Court should have borrowed the states' statutes of limitations gov-
erning attorney malpractice suits because these were the most analo-
gous to the claim of breach of duty of fair representation. 5 Although
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the Rules of Decision
Act did not control, she asserted in her dissent that Congress had not
indicated that it intended the courts to depart from the usual practice
of borrowing state law. 6 Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Stevens
that the limitation periods for malpractice actions should apply.
7
The Court borrowed from federal law again in Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates.s8 The Agency Holding Court had to
determine the appropriate limitation period for civil claims brought
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).8 9 Interestingly, Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion.90
The Court stated that its first task is to determine whether all claims
arising out of a federal statute should be characterized the same way,
79. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 168.
80. Id. at 169.
81. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988)).
82. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 155.
83. Id. at 171-72.
84. Id. at 172-74 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 174 (citing his separate opinion in United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 71
(1981)).
86. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 174-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 175.
88. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988). RICO provides no express limitation period. Agency Holding,
483 U.S. at 146.
90. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 144. Justice O'Connor dissented in DelCostello. See supra
text accompanying notes 86-87.
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noting that this characterization is a matter of federal, not state, law.9 1
The Court noted that once the characterization is made, a court should
inquire whether a federal or state statute of limitations should be used.
The Rules of Decision Act requires application of state limitation peri-
ods unless a federal rule should be applied."2 Again, Justice O'Connor
stated that congressional intent governs, and if a state limitation period
is at odds with the underlying federal right, then a court can assume
that Congress did not intend for it to borrow state periods.9 3 Noting the
confusion among the lower courts as to what state limitation period
should apply to RICO claims, the Court found that a uniform statute of
limitations should be applied to avoid uncertainty and time-consuming
litigation. 4
The Court borrowed from the Clayton Act,95 finding the cause of
action under the Clayton Act to be most analogous to civil RICO claims
because both statutes provided for treble damages, costs, and attorney's
fees.96 Additionally, both statutes were designed to deter criminal be-
havior by creating private causes of action. The Court concluded that
the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation made the
limitation period of the Clayton Act more appropriate than any state
limitation period. 8
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion traced the history of borrowing
state statutes of limitations.9 He concluded that the tradition of bor-
rowing rests on the theory that the states have the power to create stat-
utes of limitations and to determine which statute governs federal
claims.100 This determination under state law will control unless the
federal statute that creates the right preempts the state limitation pe-
91. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 147-48.
94. Id. at 148-50.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). The Clayton Act provides:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States ... and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
96. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 150-51. RICO's civil enforcement provision states: "Any
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter
may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of his suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c) (1988).
97. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 151.
98. Id. at 156.




riod.10 If it does, then no limitation on the federal cause of action ex-
ists.102 Justice Scalia was troubled by the Court's practice of basing its
decisions on congressional intent, opining that if Congress had intended
a limitation period for a statutory action, then it would have included
one in the statute.
0 3
Although borrowing from federal law could create uniformity
among the states, not all the lower federal courts choose to borrow fed-
eral limitation periods. 0 4 Uniformity results when a federal cause of ac-
tion is governed by a single federal limitation period, regardless of the
limitation laws of the forum state. Inconsistency still occurs because
some courts may decide to apply a federal limitation period, while
others may continue to apply state periods. Until the Supreme Court
makes a clear pronouncement, the practice of borrowing from federal
law will not guarantee uniformity, but instead will provide merely an-
other option for the courts, creating an opportunity for more
confusion. 105
C. Apply No Limitation Period
The majority in Agency Holding rejected Justice Scalia's conten-
tion that federal causes of action which lack a limitation period, and for
which no state statute is appropriate, should have no time limitation. 06
Clearly, limitation periods reflect important concerns, including poten-
tial defendants' interest in repose, the integrity of the judicial system,
and the interests of society in general. 0 7 Thus, the Court generally as-
101. Id. at 161-62.
102. Id. at 163-64.
103. Id. at 165-67. For a thorough analysis of both the majority's and Justice Scalia's opin-
ions, see Comment, The Parameters of Federal Common Law: The Case of Time Limitations on
Federal Causes of Action, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1447, 1474-92 (1988).
104. In Davenport v. A.C. Davenport & Son Co., 903 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh
Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit's approach, taken in In re Data Access Systems Securi-
ties Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1989), of borrow-
ing a federal limitation period for securities fraud claims brought under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5. Instead, the Seventh Circuit borrowed from a state blue sky statute.
See Davenport, 903 F.2d at 1140-41.
105. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270 (1985) (asserting the federal interest in having
"'firmly defined, easily applied rules"' for limitations) (quoting Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S.
650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). For a criticism of the federal borrowing approach, see
Comment, Determining Limitation Periods, supra note 56, at 916.
106. The majority stated the oft-quoted maxim that "[a] federal cause of action 'brought at
any distance of time' would be 'utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws'." Agency Holding, 483
U.S. at 156 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 336, 342 (1805))).
107. Statutes of limitations protect parties from being subject to indefinite threats of law-
suits, they protect the judicial system from having to consider cases where relevant evidence has
been lost or forgotten, and they protect society in general by helping to preserve stability in com-
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sumes that some limitation period must apply to any claim. 10 8 The
Court, however, has held in a few rare instances that no limitation pe-
riod applied.
In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC0 9 the Court held that
no limitation period applies to an action brought by"the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.110 Although state limitation periods might apply to
a private plaintiff, applying such periods to EEOC actions would be in-
consistent with federal policy."' Under federal law, the EEOC has sig-
nificant administrative duties that have to be discharged before it can
bring suit, so the EEOC would be prejudiced by state limitation peri-
ods." '2 The Court determined that Congress could not have intended
this result. 1 3 According to the Court, Congress addressed the need for
timeliness by providing short time periods within which charges were to
be filed with the EEOC and notice given to the employer." 4 Because of
the nature of the EEOC proceedings and the notice afforded the poten-
tial defendants, no state period should be borrowed."
5
It may be significant that the Court showed concern for uniform-
ity."' Had the case been decided after DelCostello, the Court might
have looked for an analogous federal law. Still, it seems that the core
rationale for the decision was that limitation periods were not necessary
or appropriate given the particular nature of the suit.1 7 Justice Rehn-
quist's dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger, criticized the
decision" 8 and argued that the state statute of limitations should
apply.
1 9
Eight years later, the Court again found no limitation period ap-
propriate in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation. 20 The plain-
mercial relations. See Comment, Determining Limitation Periods, supra note 56, at 897-99.
108. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
109. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
110. Id. at 366. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1988) allows the EEOC to bring a civil action in
federal district court against a private employer alleged to have violated the Civil Rights Act.
111. Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 368-72.
112. Id. at 368-79. The EEOC is required to investigate claims of employment discrimination
and settle disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive fashion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
113. Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 368-69.
114. Id. at 371-72.
115. See id. at 371-73.
116. "It would hardly be reasonable to suppose that ... Congress ... would... consign
[the EEOC's] federal lawsuits to the vagaries of diverse state limitations statutes ...... Id. at 370-
71.
117. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
118. Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 373-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (calling the majority deci-
sion a "process of unwarranted judicial legislation").
119. Id. at 384.
120. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
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tiffs in the case claimed that a 1795 conveyance from their ancestors to
New York State violated the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793.121 The
complaint requested fair rental value of the lands conveyed illegally for
the two years prior to commencement of the suit.122 The Court held
that borrowing a state limitation period in this case would be inconsis-
tent with the federal policy of not limiting Native American claims. 23
Thus, borrowing a limitation period would violate Congress's will.
12 4
This reasoning is confusing because the Court did not hold that the
action was maintainable under the 1793 Act, but instead under federal
common law.12 5 One must assume that the Court was concerned not
with Congress's intent, but with some general federal policy toward Na-
tive American claims.
1 26
The Court rarely will decide to apply no limitation period at all,
based on the importance of time limitations in the history of American
jurisprudence. Still, this option does offer some advantages over bor-
rowing.127 First, the no-limitation option allows a court to avoid barring
an otherwise valid claim. Second, the lack of consistency and uniform-
ity inherent in the borrowing method could be obviated if all courts
declined to find limitation periods for federal claims that lack them.
Finally, some have argued that any borrowing is simply a guise for judi-
cial legislation.12 Finding that no existing limitation periods were ap-
plicable would force Congress to make the limitation decision. 29
D. Apply the Doctrine of Laches
In Holmberg v. Armbrecht the Supreme Court held that no strict
statutory limitation period will apply to a federal cause of action when
121. Id. at 229. The Act provided that no person or entity should purchase any lands owned
by Native Americans without the acquiescence of the federal government. Indian Trade and Inter-
course Act, ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329 (1793). The State of New York, without the necessary approval,
entered into an agreement with the Oneidas whereby it bought all of their land. Oneida, 470 U.S.
at 232.
122. The plaintiffs commenced the suit in 1970, seeking damages representing the fair rental
value of the lands for the period January 1, 1968, through December 31, 1969. Oneida, 470 U.S. at
229.
123. Id. at 240-41.
124. Id. at 244.
125. Id. at 233-36.
126. The Court focused on limitation treatment of other statutes giving rise to Native Ameri-
can land claims. Id. at 241-44.
127. For an evaluation of this approach, see Comment, Determining Limitation Periods,
supra note 56, at 912-13.
128. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 170 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394-95 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
129. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 170 (Scalia, J., concurring); Belleville Shoe, 908 F.2d at
1394 (Posner, J., concurring).
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the sole remedy is in equity.13 0 The Court then remanded the case to
the lower court to determine if laches would bar the plaintiff's suit.1"'
Laches ordinarily is comprised of two elements: inexcusable delay by
the plaintiff in bringing suit, and prejudice to the defendant due to that
delay.
32
In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC the Court refused to
apply a state statute of limitations, but intimated that in the case of
undue delay courts could restrict or even deny backpay relief.3 3 Also, in
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation Justices Stevens, White,
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger argued in dissent that laches
should bar the Native Americans' claims. 34 This is significant because
the claim in Oneida was an action at law, not in equity.3 5 The Justices
acknowledged that laches would be novel in an action for damages, but
found that real property disputes, such as the present one, often were
resolved by resorting to equity.3 6 In addition, the case involved a judi-
cially created cause of action, so the Court did not need to be concerned
with frustrating congressional intent.
3 7
Like the application of no limitation periods, the use of laches ame-
liorates some of the harshness associated with statutes of limitations.
Laches could create even more inconsistency than borrowing, however,
because laches is applied on a case-by-case basis.13 Therefore, the basic
rationales for statutes of limitations would be undermined completely.
The defendant's interests ultimately may be served when a court deter-
mines that a claim against him is barred, but not before he has been
haled into court. Likewise, courts would expend scarce judicial re-
sources to determine whether laches applied in a given case. Finally, it
is difficult for a prospective claimant to predict when an otherwise valid
claim becomes extinguished by time. Thus, laches does not offer a sig-
130. 327 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1946). See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
131. Id. at 397-98.
132. Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30-31 (1951); Note, supra note 30, at 1141 & n.91.
133. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977).
134. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 261-62 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 120-26.
135. The plaintiffs in Oneida sought monetary damages. See supra note 122.
136. Oneida, 470 U.S. at 261-65. The dissenting Justices apparently did not consider the suit
in Occidental Life, in which the court hinted at laches, to be an action at law, because they did not
mention that case in their discussion. Some commentators, however, consider Occidental Life, de-
cided before Oneida, to be the first case in which the Supreme Court allowed for laches in a legal
action. E.g., Note, supra note 30, at 1141-43; Comment, Determing Limitation Periods, supra note
56, at 913-14. The Occidental Life Court did not address the anomaly of applying laches to a legal
action. Therefore, one can assume that the Court found the enforcement action for backpay to be
an equitable action.
137. See Oneida, 470 U.S. at 270-73.
138. Note, Fair Representation by a Union: A Federal Right in Need of a Federal Statute
of Limitations, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 896, 904 (1983).
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nificant improvement over borrowing."' 9
E. Create a Limitation Period
Some commentators have suggested that courts simply should cre-
ate limitation periods for actions under consideration that lack them.
140
Such an approach could obviate the inconsistency associated with bor-
rowing."" Uniformity would result, however, only when the Supreme
Court set the time limitation for each action definitively. Until then,
the creation by lower courts of different time periods probably would be
less uniform than borrowing. Thus, allowing courts to create limitation
periods does not seem to be the answer.
Regardless of the temptation to create limitation periods, the Su-
preme Court is very reluctant to engage in judicial legislation.142 In the
majority of cases, the Court does not even consider the option of creat-
ing a limitation period, but assumes that it should borrow from some
other legislative source. 4 3 In United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp.14 4 a union requested that the Supreme Court create a uniform
limitation period for actions brought under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.145 The Court refused, finding that to do so
would violate congressional intent.146 The Court concluded that al-
though uniformity was needed in labor law, prior case law did not re-
quire "so bald a form of judicial innovation.' 4 7 Most commentators
agree with the Court that the creation of limitation periods is per-
formed more appropriately by Congress.
48
139. For an analysis reaching the same conclusion, see Note, supra note 30, at 1141-46.
140. See, e.g., id. at 1131 (stating that courts are "well-placed" to create limitation periods
because they are positioned to appreciate their effects).
141. Comment, Determining Limitation Periods, supra note 56, at 917.
142. See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966).
143. See, e.g., Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 703-04; Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104-05
(1971); Note, Disparities in Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YALE L.J. 738, 745
(1940).
144. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
145. Id. at 701; see supra notes 69, 71.
146. Although the Court recognized that § 301 granted broad authority to the courts to fash-
ion labor law, the Court could not infer that Congress intended the courts to invent a limitation
period. Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 701-04. Justice White, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, argued
in dissent that Congress did intend for the courts to create limitation periods for § 301, id. at 710
(White, J., dissenting), and that courts should be free to draw upon any source, including state and
federal statutes of limitations, to arrive at the proper period. Id. at 714.
147. Id. at 701. In at least one case, however, the Court has suggested that it would create a
limitation period in extraordinary circumstances. Although finding those circumstances not to exist
in the instant case, the Court, in Chevron Oil, stated that "[a] special federal statute of limitations
is created, as a matter of federal common law, only when the need for uniformity is particularly
great or when the nature of the federal right demands a particular sort of statute of limitations."
Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 104.
148. See, e.g., New York Report, supra note 52, at 16; Comment, Determining Limitation
1991] 1371
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1355
IV. JUDGE POSNER'S PROPOSALS
In Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Co. 149 the Seventh Cir-
cuit announced that it would join the Third Circuit in borrowing the
limitation period from Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 to gov-
ern securities fraud claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.150 Judge Easterbrook's majority opin-
ion detailed the history of borrowing and determined that it was time
to borrow a federal limitation period for the judicially created cause of
action. 51
Judge Posner agreed with the decision in his concurring opinion,
but expressed dissatisfaction with the borrowing practice altogether. 152
Judge Posner argued that statutes of limitations should not be ex-
tended to actions they did not originally cover because Congress's true
motivations for enacting a particular limitation period are difficult to
glean and may not apply to other actions.'5 " He criticized the practice
of borrowing as being without standards and completely at the discre-
tion of the judge, and cautioned that different courts could not be ex-
pected to arrive at the same limitation period for a given cause of action
before repeated litigation had settled the issue.154
Judge Posner noted that judges feel they must borrow limitation
periods rather than create them because they fear accusations of arbi-
trariness and judicial legislation. s55 Judge Posner pointed out, however,
that selecting which period to borrow is inevitably as arbitrary as creat-
Periods, supra note 56, at 917-18; Special Project, supra note 7, at 1104-05; Note, supra note 30, at
1131-32.
149. 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
150. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), and
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989), promulgated thereunder, prohibit fraud in connection
with the purchase and sale of securities. Section 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988), pro-
vides a three-year statute of limitations for actions brought under the Act for materially incorrect
or misleading information in securities sales.
In In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3rd Cir. 1988) (en banc),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1989), the Third Circuit held that § 13 would govern § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 claims.
151. Belleville Shoe, 908 F.2d at 1387-89. The implied right of action under § 10(b) has
existed for approximately 45 years. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514
(E.D. Pa. 1946).
152. Belleville Shoe, 908 F.2d at 1393-95 (Posner, J., concurring). Interestingly, Judge Posner
served on the Federal Courts Study Committee. See supra note 13. The decision in Belleville Shoe
was issued four months after the Committee's final report and four months before the enactment
of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.
153. Judge Posner called the process "a matter of which round peg to stuff in a square hole,"
and argued that statutes of limitations are "unprincipled legislative deals." Belleville Shoe, 908
F.2d at 1393-94 (Posner, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1394.
155. Id. According to Judge Posner, legislators may be arbitrary but judges may not. Id.
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ing a limitation period.156 Judge Posner discussed the possibility of
judges simply creating statutes of limitations openly and without apol-
ogy, but concluded that this would effect only modest improvements.
15 7
Judge Posner found that an institutional solution was necessary
and proposed two options. 58 His first proposal was the enactment of a
congressional rule that every statute must contain a statute of limita-
tions.15 9 Judge Posner opined that this rule would be superior to the
then proposed, and now enacted, 60 general catch-all statute of limita-
tions because no single limitation period is suitable for the entire range
of causes of action in statutes that do not specify a period.' 6 1 He admit-
ted that such a rule might be ineffectual unless Congress created a
"nagging agency" to enforce it. 162 In the alternative, Judge Posner sug-
gested that the Supreme Court could adopt Justice Scalia's proposal
that a statute lacking a limitation period should have no time limita-
tion, modified somewhat by allowing for the use of laches.1
63
Judge Posner's other proposal was that Congress should delegate
the power to adopt limitation periods to either the Judicial Conference
of the United States or an agency modeled on the United States Sen-
tencing Commission. 6 4 He argued that this delegation would relieve
Congress of the burden of having to amend numerous statutes to in-
clude limitation periods and also would provide an expert body that
could create limitation periods without resort to litigation. 65
A. A New Rule for Congress
Judge Posner's proposal, that Congress should enact a rule requir-
ing it to create a statute of limitations for every statutory action, is
similar to one of the suggestions of the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee. 66 It is not clear whether Judge Posner intended his proposed rule
156. "You cannot ... reason to the right statute of limitations to borrow. The imponder-
ables are so numerous that in the end the borrowing judgment... is inescapably arbitrary, as the
present case illustrates." Id.
157. Judge Posner cited the doctrine of laches as precedent, but concluded, for many of the
reasons identified in this Note, that judge-made limitation periods were not the solution. Id. See
supra subpart I(E).
158. Belleville Shoe, 908 F.2d at 1394-95 (Posner, J., concurring).
159. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
160. See supra text accompanying note 18.
161. Belleville Shoe, 908 F.2d at 1395 (Posner, J., concurring).
162. Id.
163. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
164. Belleville Shoe, 908 F.2d at 1395 (Posner, J., concurring). See infra notes 171-90 and
accompanying text.
165. Belleville Shoe, 908 F.2d at 1395 (Posner, J., concurring).
166. The Committee suggested that Congress consider a "checklist" for legislative staff to use
in reviewing proposed legislation, with one of the items on the list being the inclusion of an appro-
1991] 1373
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to apply prospectively or retroactively. Clearly, a retroactive rule would
be preferable to address the current lack of limitation periods for ex-
isting federal causes of action. That the Committee suggested such a
retroactive rule and that Congress neglected to follow the suggestion,1
7
however, does not bode well for the rule's enactment in the near future.
B. Delegation to an Administrative Agency
Judge Posner's second proposal, delegation to the Judicial Confer-
ence or to a commission created especially to adopt limitation periods,
would relieve Congress of a burden that it seems unable or unwilling to
shoulder: that of creating statutes of limitations to govern actions aris-
ing under existing statutes. Before considering the constitutionality of
such a delegation, this Note briefly describes the current duties of the
Judicial Conference and the Sentencing Commission on which a "Stat-
utes of Limitations Commission" would be modeled under Judge Pos-
ner's scheme.
1. The Judicial Conference
Created in 1922,168 the Judicial Conference of the United States
includes the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court as chair-
man, the chief judges of the twelve circuits, the chief judge of the Court
of International Trade, and one district judge elected from each circuit
for a three-year term. 6 9 The Chief Justice is to submit an annual report
to Congress detailing the Conference's proceedings and its recommen-
dations for legislation.1
7 0
The Conference is authorized: (1) to survey the condition of busi-
ness in the federal courts and to recommend to Congress reassignment
of judges according to need; (2) to submit suggestions to the federal
courts to promote uniformity of procedures and the expeditious con-
duct of court business; (3) to investigate, discipline, and recommend to
the House of Representatives impeachment of federal judges; and (4) to
study the operation and effect of rules prescribed for the federal courts
by the Supreme Court, and to recommend to the Court changes in and
additions to those rules to simplify procedure, make administration
priate statute of limitations for statutes creating causes of action. Study Committee Report, supra
note 14, at 93.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20 and supra note 166. Section 1658 was the only
legislation Congress enacted in response to the Committee's suggested reforms.
168. The Judicial Conference was established by the Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42
Stat. 838 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)). For a synopsis of the history of the
creation of the Conference, see Myers, Origin of the Judicial Conference, 57 A.B.A. J. 597 (1971).




more fair, arrive at the just determination of litigation, and eliminate
unjustifiable expense and delay.171 In addition, the Conference is to
modify or abrogate any rules prescribed by courts, other than the Su-
preme Court or the district courts, which the Conference finds inconsis-




The delegation to the Judicial Conference suggested by Judge Pos-
ner would be a departure from the Conference's current role of moni-
toring and administering the internal affairs of the federal judiciary.
Statutes of limitations affect those persons outside the Judicial Branch
markedly more than they affect those persons inside.
2. A Statute of Limitations Commission
Under Judge Posner's second delegation proposal, Congress would
create a "Statute of Limitations Commission" authorized to adopt by
regulation a limitation period for any statute without one. Since the
agency would be modeled on the United States Sentencing Commission
(Sentencing Commission),7 3 this subpart outlines the Sentencing Com-
mission's duties and powers.
With the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act),17 4 Congress cre-
ated the Sentencing Commission and empowered it to promulgate
guidelines for sentencing persons convicted of federal law violations.
The Act was designed to reduce the disparity among sentences for per-
sons convicted of the same offense. 75 Also, the Act sought to alleviate
the uncertainty as to the time a sentenced offender would spend in
prison before parole under the existing system.171
The Act established the Sentencing Commission as an independent
body in the judicial branch,1 77 with seven voting members appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate. 17  At least three of the
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra text accompanying note 164.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
175. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989). The reason for the disuniformity
was that, although congressional statutes specified the penalties for federal crimes, they often gave
the sentencing judge wide discretion over whether a sentence would include imprisonment, rather
than a fine or probation, and the duration of the offender's incarceration.
176. Once the judge determined the length of incarceration, parole officials had the authority
to release a prisoner at their discretion before the expiration of the sentence imposed by the judge.
Id. at 363. Congress sought to rectify the sentence and parole disparities by vesting the Commis-
sion with the powers previously exercised by the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission. Id.
at 367 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, 995(a)(1)).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
178. Id. The Attorney General or his designee is to serve as the eighth, ex officio nonvoting
member. Id. When considering the appointment of voting members, the President is to consult
with "judges, prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys, law enforcement officials, senior citizens,
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seven members must be federal judges selected from a list of six recom-
mended by the Judicial Conference. 7" Each member is limited to two
six-year terms,180 and is subject to removal by the President only for
neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or for other good cause.8 "
The Sentencing Commission is authorized to devise sentencing
guidelines that are binding on the federal courts.182 The sentences sug-
gested by the guidelines must be within the limits of existing law,18 3 but
the sentence ranges must be narrower. 8 4 While the sentencing judge
retains some discretion to depart from the guidelines, the reasons for
such a departure must be included in the trial record.'8 5
In addition to its duty to promulgate the guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission is to review and revise them periodically after consulting
with authorities on the criminal justice system. 88 The Sentencing Com-
mission must report to Congress any amendments it makes to the
guidelines,8 7 along with recommendations as to whether Congress
should modify the limits and grades it has established, 8 and an annual
analysis of the operation of the guidelines.' Finally, the Sentencing
Commission is empowered to monitor the compliance of probation of-
ficers with the guidelines, 19 0 and to perform any other functions that
assist the federal courts in meeting their sentencing responsibilities.19
Like the Sentencing Reform Act, a Statute of Limitations Reform
Act would create a commission in an effort to remove disparities and
uncertainty from the federal judicial system. A Statute of Limitations
Commission, following the Sentencing Commission's model, would be
an independent agency within the judicial branch. The Limitations
victims of crime, and others interested in the criminal justice process." Id. The President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, is to appoint one of the voting members as the Chairman. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 992(a)-(b).
181. Id. § 991(a).
182. Id. § 994(a).
183. Id. § 994(b)(1).
184. The maximum sentence under the guidelines may not exceed the minimum by more
than 25% or six months, except that if the minimum is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life
imprisonment. Id. § 994(b)(2).
185. The judge enjoys this discretion only if there is an aggravating or mitigating factor that
the Commission did not adequately consider when formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
186. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).
187. Such amendments take effect 180 days after they are submitted to Congress unless Con-
gress modifies or disapproves of them by statute. Id. § 994(p).
188. Id. § 994(r).
189. The analysis is to include for each sentence imposed under the guidelines: A written
report of the sentence; the offense for which it is imposed; the age, race, and sex of the offender;
information regarding factors made relevant by the guidelines; and other information deemed ap-
propriate by the Commission. Id. § 994(w).
190. Id. § 995(a)(9).
191. Id. § 995(a)(22).
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Commission would consist at least partially of federal judges, with all
members appointed by the President and removable only for cause.
A Statute of Limitations Commission would have the authority to
create limitation periods for all federal statutes creating causes of ac-
tion but lacking corresponding statutes of limitations. The Limitations
Commission periodically would review and revise limitation periods
previously promulgated under its authority, and would recommend to
Congress modifications of limitation periods already established by
statute. Conceivably, the Limitations Commission also would have ju-
risdiction over matters ancillary to limitation periods, such as tolling,
accrual, commencement, relation-back, survival, and revival."" While
such a Limitations Commission conceivably could solve the statute of
limitations problems that have plagued the federal judiciary since
M'Cluny, the Limitations Commission might not pass constitutional
muster.
C. Constitutional Concerns Regarding Delegation
A court considering the validity of a congressionally created limita-
tions agency' s s probably would focus first on whether the agency en-
joyed an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the judicial
branch. Second, a court probably would consider whether such a dele-
gation, if allowable, violated the separation of powers scheme of the
Constitution. Mistretta v. United States194 concerned a challenge to the
Sentencing Commission's authority and serves as the touchstone for the
following analysis of the delegation proposed by Judge Posner.
1. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine is based on the separation of powers
scheme found in the Constitution. 9 5 Delegation of legislative powers to
another governmental branch is improper because the Constitution re-
quires that the legislative powers of the federal government be vested in
Congress."9 ' The Court has struck down only two statutes under the
nondelegation doctrine, both in 1935. Since A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
192. For a discussion of how these issues have troubled federal courts when applying state
statutes of limitations, see Special Project, supra note 7, at 1084-95.
193. Because delegation to either the Judicial Conference or an independent commission
modeled on the Sentencing Commission involves delegation to a body within the judicial branch
comprised partially of Article M judges, these agencies are treated alike for the constitutional
analysis in this Note. Accordingly, they are referred to collectively as "a limitations agency."
194. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
195. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421-30 (1935).
196. U.S. Co~sT. art I, § 1.
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Corp. v. United States197 and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,198 the
Court has not invoked the doctrine except to interpret statutes nar-
rowly to avoid excessive delegation that otherwise would be unconstitu-
tional.199 Still, the doctrine has not been overruled and must be
considered.
The nondelegation doctrine, as explained in Mistretta, requires
that Congress specify a general policy, the agency which is to apply the
policy, and the boundaries of the delegated authority.200 The Mistretta
Court upheld the authority of the Sentencing Commission because the
delegation was sufficiently specific and detailed: Congress charged the
Sentencing Commission with three goals20 1 and specified four purposes
of sentencing that the Sentencing Commission was to pursue in carry-
ing out its mandate. 0 2 In addition, Congress provided a detailed set of
guidelines for the Sentencing Commission to employ in regulating sen-
tencing,2°3 and directed the Sentencing Commission to develop a system
of ranges to apply to various categories of offenses and defendants.204
Congress also provided seven factors that the Sentencing Commission
was to consider in its formulation of offense categories and eleven fac-
tors relating to defendant categorization.0 5 The Sentencing Commis-
197. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
198. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
199. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342
(1974).
200. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 (citing American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90,
105 (1946)).
201. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374. The goals were: (1) to "assure the meeting of the purposes of
sentencing as set forth" in the Act; (2) to "provide certainty and fairness" in meeting these pur-
poses; and (3) to "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior
as it relates to the criminal justice process." Id. at 374 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)).
202. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374. The purposes were: (1) "to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense"; (2) "to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct"; (3) "to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant"; and (4) "to provide the defendant with needed ... correctional treatment." Id.
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)).
203. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
204. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)). These guidelines were to include
determinations of (1) whether to impose probation, a fine, or a term of imprisonment; (2) the
appropriate amount of the fine or the appropriate term of probation or imprisonment; (3) whether
the imprisonment, if imposed, should include a requirement of supervised release, and if so, for
how long; and (4) whether multiple terms of imprisonment should run concurrently or consecu-
tively. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1).
205. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 375-76. The offense categorization factors include (1) the grade of
the offense; (2) the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime; (3) the nature and
degree of harm caused by the crime; (4) the community view of the gravity of the offense; (5) the
public concern generated by the crime; (6) the deterrent effect that a particular sentence may have
on others; and (7) the current incidence of the offense. Id. at 375 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(1)-(7)).
The offender characterization factors include the offender's age, education, vocational skills,
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sion was forbidden from considering the race, sex, national origin,
creed, or socioeconomic status of offenders, and the guidelines were not
to reflect any other factors that might serve as proxies for those specifi-
cally forbidden.0 6
Congress also directed that the guidelines must require higher
sentences for crimes involving violence or drugs 07 or crimes committed
by certain offenders. 08 Congress instructed that the guidelines gener-
ally should provide for imprisonment for crimes of violence resulting in
serious bodily injury, but should not require imprisonment for first of-
fenders not convicted of serious offenses. 209 Finally, Congress listed va-
rious aggravating and mitigating circumstances that the guidelines
should take into account. 210 Thus, Congress specified a detailed hierar-
chy of punishment 2"' and stipulated the most important offense and
offender characteristics for the Sentencing Commission to consider
when promulgating its sentencing guidelines.
The Mistretta Court acknowledged that the Sentencing Commis-
sion had significant discretion to determine the relative severity of fed-
eral crimes, to assess the relative weight of the offender characteristics,
to determine which crimes had been punished too leniently or too se-
verely in the past, and to decide which types of crimes and criminals
were similar for the purpose of sentencing.212 The Court found, how-
ever, that Congress was not prohibited from delegating authority that
required policy judgments."' Only if there were an absence of stan-
dards for the agency's guidance, rendering it impossible for a court to
ascertain whether the agency had obeyed congressional will, would the
Court strike down Congress's decision to delegate." 4 The Court found
that Congress provided sufficient standards for the Sentencing Commis-
sion and that the criteria supplied by Congress were adequate for carry-
ing out the general policy and purpose of the Act.215
Mindful of Mistretta, Congress could provide detailed guidelines
for a limitations agency in order to avoid violating the nondelegation
mental and emotional condition, physical condition (including drug dependence), previous employ-
ment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history,
and degree of dependence upon crime for a livelihood. Id. at 376 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(1)-
(11)).
206. Id. at 376 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)-(e)).
207. Id. at 376 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)).
208. Id. at 376-77 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)).
209. Id. at 377 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994j)).
210. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(l), (n)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 377-78 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(c), (d), (m)).
213. Id. at 378.
214. Id. at 378-79 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 425-26 (1944)).
215. Id. at 379.
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doctrine. Congress could instruct the agency to consider certain factors
relevant to statutes of limitations: the interests of defendants in repose;
the interests of the judicial system in considering evidence before it be-
comes stale; the interests of plaintiffs in having adequate time to pre-
pare claims; and the interest of society in having a fair, reliable judicial
system.216 Congress could set a hierarchy of claims, specifying which
types of claims should receive longer limitation periods than others.
Congress even could instruct the agency to draw from federal or state
statutes of limitations. All of these standards would be in accord with
Mistretta's application of the nondelegation doctrine to the Sentencing
Commission, and would support a finding that a limitations agency
would not enjoy constitutionally excessive delegation.
A limitations agency would differ from the Sentencing Commission,
however, in one important respect: The Sentencing Commission was
created to narrow sentence ranges already enacted by Congress, while
the limitations agency would exist because of Congress's failure to enact
statutes of limitations for many claims. Thus, while the Sentencing
Commission serves to narrowly tailor existing law, the limitations
agency would promulgate new law in the form of specific limitation pe-
riods. In this respect, the creation of a limitations agency would seem to
fly in the face of the nondelegation doctrine: Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to another branch. In the past, the Court has upheld
delegations of power to agencies to regulate areas not previously cov-
ered by legislation.1 7 It may be significant, however, that statutes of
limitations traditionally have been the exclusive domain of legislatures.
State legislatures have not shied away from regulating limitation
periods.21
2. Separation of Powers
After determining that Congress had not delegated excessive au-
thority, the Mistretta Court focused on whether the Sentencing Com-
mission's structure violated the separation of powers principle of the
Constitution.21 While recognizing the importance of the principle, the
Court noted that the Constitution does not require that the three
branches be entirely separate and distinct.220 The Court stated that it
will allow statutory schemes that commingle the functions of the
216. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
218. State legislatures, more so than Congress, have been active in implementing limitation
periods. See Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1179
(1950).




branches as long as one branch does not enjoy increased power at the
expense of another.2 1
The Court expressed two concerns raised by the delegation to the
Sentencing Commission: First, that the judicial branch should not per-
form duties more appropriately performed by the other branches, and
second, that the institutional integrity of the judicial branch should not
be threatened.222 Because a limitations agency would raise these same
concerns, this subpart examines Mistretta's separation of powers analy-
sis in detail.
The Court first considered the placement of the Sentencing Com-
mission within the judicial branch.223 While recognizing that nonjudicial
executive or administrative duties normally may not be assigned to
judges,224 the Court found that judicial rulemaking falls within a consti-
tutional "twilight area" in which some commingling of the activities of
the three branches is allowable.2 25 The Court then discussed the power
of Congress to delegate to the judiciary the power to promulgate the
federal rules of civil procedure, and Congress's power to create the Ju-
dicial Conference, the Rules Advisory Committee, and the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts.226 The Court concluded that the
Constitution allows these delegations because the duties involved are so
closely related to the judiciary's power to pronounce judgments.227 Ac-
cordingly, these activities are not more appropriate for another
branch.22s Likewise, the placement of the Sentencing Commission in the
judicial branch simply acknowledges the role that courts always have
played in sentencing, and thus poses no danger to the separation of
powers.229
The Court also found that the location of the Sentencing Commis-
sion within the judicial branch does not undermine the integrity of that
branch or unduly expand the powers of the judiciary.23 ° While the Sen-
221. Id. at 382 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)).
222. Id. at 383 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680-81, and Commodity Futures, 478 U.S. at
851).
223. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384-97.
224. Id. at 385 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677).
225. Id. at 386 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637, (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
226. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387.
227. Id. at 386-90.
228. Id. at 390.
229. Id. at 390-91. "In other words, the Commission's functions, like this Court's function in
promulgating procedural rules, are clearly attendant to a central element of the historically ac-
knowledged mission of the Judicial Branch." Id. at 391.
230. Id. at 393.
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tencing Commission does perform quasi-legislative functions, it is not a
court, but is an independent agency. Thus, there is no combination of
legislative and judicial power within a single body in the judicial
branch.231 The judicial branch does not enjoy increased authority be-
cause the Sentencing Commission is bound by Congress's sentencing
ranges just as the courts were prior to the creation of the Sentencing
Commission.3 2 Finally,, the degree of political authority involved with
the promulgation of the guidelines is not inappropriate for a nonpoliti-
cal branch because, although the guidelines have substantive effects on
public behavior, they do not regulate the primary conduct of the
public.33
The Court next considered the composition of the Sentencing Com-
mission, focusing on whether the requirement of judicial service under-
mines the integrity of the judicial branch.2 s The Court found that
neither the text of nor the historical gloss on the Constitution precludes
extrajudicial service by judges in their individual capacities s.23  Accord-
ingly, while Congress may not assign extrajudicial duties to a court or
judges acting as members of a court, it may assign such duties to judges
acting in their individual capacities as members of a commission.
2 3 6
Also, the Sentencing Reform Act does not threaten the independence of
the judiciary because the Act does not give the President the power to
force a judge to serve on the Sentencing Commission against his will. 37
Participation by judges on the Sentencing Commission would not affect
their ability to adjudicate impartially sentencing issues.238 Finally, the
participation of judges on the Sentencing Commission does not
threaten the appearance of impartiality because the creation of sentenc-
ing guidelines is a neutral function particularly appropriate to the judi-
cial branch.239
Finally, the Court considered the President's power under the Act
to appoint and remove judges as members of the Sentencing Commis-
231. Unlike a court, the Commission does not exercise judicial power and is not controlled
by, or accountable to, the members of the judicial branch. The Commission is fully accountable to
Congress. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. Its members are subject to the President's
limited powers of removal, and its rulemaking power is subject to the notice and comment require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (1988). Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391-
94.
232. Id. at 395.
233. Id. at 396.
234. Id. at 397-408.
235. Id. at 397-404.
236. Id. at 404.
237. Id. at 405-06.
238. Id. at 406-07.




sion.240 The Court found it unimaginable that judges would alter their
judicial actions to receive appointments to the Sentencing Commis-
sion.2 ' While the President may remove judges from the Sentencing
Commission, the Act in no way authorizes him to remove them as
judges. In addition, the President's removal power is limited to removal
for good cause. 2 Thus, the Act does not threaten the ability of the
judges serving on the Sentencing Commission to perform their Article
III duties.2 45 The Court thus concluded that the Sentencing Reform Act
neither delegates excessive legislative power nor upsets the separation
of powers mandated by the Constitution.244
The preceding analysis would support finding a limitations agency
within the judicial branch constitutionally permissible. A court proba-
bly would find that selecting an appropriate limitation period is as es-
sential to the determination of cases or controversies as the rules of
civil procedure or the selection of an appropriate sentence. Thus, the
location of an agency within the judicial branch would be no more in-
congruous than the powers already delegated to the branch.
Location of the agency within the branch conceivably could expand
the power of the judiciary, however, because the limitation periods se-
lected by the agency would have more of an effect on the general public
than the sentencing guidelines considered in Mistretta. Unlike the sen-
tencing guidelines, which affect an individual only after conviction of a
crime, the limitation periods determine when an individual may have
access to the judicial system. Still, the limitation periods arguably
would affect parties to a suit no more than the federal rules of civil
procedure. Congress delegated the authority to promulgate these rules
to the judiciary over fifty-five years ago. 5
The Mistretta Court, however, seemed to rely on the fact that the
guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission were required
by law to be within the sentence ranges previously established by Con-
gress. Thus, a chief problem could be that Congress has provided no
limitation periods in the first place. The duties performed by the limi-
tations agency would be not so much quasi-legislative as outright legis-
lative. The limitations agency would be acting in an area that Congress
had declined to enter. This difficulty could be tempered somewhat by a
240. Id. at 408-11.
241. Id. at 408-10.
242. Id. at 410-11.
243. Id. at 411.
244. Id. at 412.
245. This delegation was upheld in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). Congress
delegated this authority with the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387.
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provision that, like the guidelines in Mistretta, the limitation periods
would not take effect until Congress had an opportunity to revise
them.2 46 In addition, a court considering the validity of a limitations
agency might rely on the fact that it would be an independent agency,
rather than a court, and thus might find that there was no combination
of legislative and judicial functions within the judicial branch.
A court considering the composition of the agency and the power of
the President to appoint and remove members probably would find
them constitutionally permissible, following Mistretta. The analysis
would be no different for a limitations agency than it was for the Sen-
tencing Commission.
D. Creation of a Study Committee
If Congress wants the expertise provided by a limitations agency,
but is concerned with the constitutional validity of such a delegation, it
could create a committee, similar to the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee, charged with the duty of recommending appropriate limitation pe-
riods to Congress.247 Under this system, a body of experts would have
the resources and authority to determine what limitation periods
should govern federal causes of action, but there would be no constitu-
tional concern, because the committee would not promulgate the limita-
tion periods itself. Rather, the committee simply would recommend the
periods to Congress, who would have the final decision and authority to
legislate the periods as it saw fit. Naturally, the committee would be a
viable alternative to a permanent agency only if Congress followed the
committee's recommendations. Ideally, Congress simply would rubber-
stamp the recommendations into law.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress added Section 1658 to Title 28 of the United States Code
with the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 because it was dissatisfied
with borrowing.248 Section 1658 was intended to provide a limitation
246. See supra note 187.
247. See supra note 13.
248. At present, the federal courts "borrow" the most analogous state law limitations pe-
riod for federal claims lacking limitations periods. Borrowing, while defensible as a decisional
approach in the absence of legislation, appeals [sic] to lack persuasive support as a matter of
policy.
It also creates several practical problems: It obligates judges and lawyers to determine the
most analogous state law claim; it imposes uncertainty on litigants; reliance on varying state
laws results in undesirable variance among the federal courts and disrupts the development of
federal doctrine on the suspension of limitation periods.
136 CONG. REC. S17,581 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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period for statutory causes of action lacking one.249 Section 1658 falls
short of the mark, however, because it applies only to causes of action
arising under statutes enacted after December 1, 1990.250 As this Note
makes clear, there has been, and will continue to be, much disagree-
ment over appropriate limitation periods for the many causes of action
arising under statutes enacted before 1990. Congress perceived the
problems associated with borrowing, but has not done enough to rem-
edy a situation brought about by its own failure to provide limitation
periods. Clearly, Congress must do more.
The simplest solution would be for Congress to amend Section 1658
to apply to all causes of action arising under federal statutes, regardless
of the date of those statutes' enactment. The problem with a fallback
statute of limitations, however, is that it does not reflect intelligently
the concerns prompting limitation periods in the first place. Legisla-
tures create different limitation periods for different causes of action
based on the particular features of those causes of action.251 A fallback
period ignores the peculiarities of various causes of action and lumps
them all under the same time period. Even a fallback period, however,
would create certainty among litigants and uniformity among the fed-
eral courts-something that is impossible under the present version of
Section 1658.
If Congress wants to provide a thoughtful assignment of limitation
periods to individual causes of action, it could enact Judge Posner's
suggested delegation and repeal Section 1658. While it is not certain
that such a scheme would be constitutionally valid, Mistretta would
strongly support its validity. Delegation would alleviate Congress's bur-
den of determining a limitation period governing every cause of action,
but would assure that a competent body would make the necessary de-
liberations to determine an appropriate period for every cause of action.
This would be preferable to amending Section 1658 and would certainly
be an improvement over Section 1658 as it now reads.
Another alternative would be for Congress to create a study com-
mittee charged with the duty of recommending appropriate limitation
periods to Congress. The committee could be created in conjunction
with, or in lieu of, the present Section 1658. If Congress is content with
the fallback period applicable to future statutory causes of action, then
a temporary committee2 52 could be responsible for selecting periods for
statutory causes of action created before the enactment of Section 1658.
249, See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
251. See Developments in the Law, supra note 218, at 1192-97.
252. The Federal Courts Study Committee is an example of a temporary committee-it was
commissioned to study the federal courts system for 15 months. See supra note 13.
1991] 1385
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Then, causes of action created before 1990 would have narrowly tailored
limitation periods, and Congress either could let the fallback period
govern future statutory causes of action as a default provision or could
enact specific periods governing new causes of action as they are
created.'"
In any event, it is clear that the burden falls on Congress to remedy
the current state of federal limitations law. While Section 1658 was cre-
ated to do this, it will not be successful unless courts ignore its clear
language. It is somewhat ironic that Congress perceived a problem and
acted on it, but actually did nothing to ameliorate it. Congress should
attempt again to solve this problem that has vexed the federal courts
since 1830.254
M. Patrick McDowell
253. The Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate presumably would have an interest
in having appropriate statutes of limitations. They should play a role in ensuring that future con-
gressionally created actions contain limitation periods.
254. "Few areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than
does the subject of periods of limitations." Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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